On Paper
A folder, a card, a scoreboard, a test, a binder, a contract, a poster, a register, a sign-on sheet, an incident report, a permit, an audit, a dashboard, a stamp, a control list, a signature, a noticeboard, a tidy yard, a signed form, an approval. Each one says the risk is handled. Each film asks the same question: says who?
Pig has the paperwork. Wolf has the questions. Each film runs under a minute and works as a toolbox talk opener. Below each one you will find the argument behind it, three questions to put to your team, and the sources every claim rests on. The point is never the person holding the paper. It is the system that decided the paper was enough.
Qualified on Paper
A folder of tickets says a worker is job ready. Nobody has watched them do the job.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Competency-based assessment is meant to check two things: what a person knows, and what they can do. The evidence has to show the skill, and it has to be valid, sufficient, authentic and current.
A folder of certificates proves someone was signed off somewhere, at some point. It does not prove they can do this task, with this gear, on this site, today. When the folder becomes the evidence, the paperwork gets assessed instead of the person.
Records matter. They are where a competence system starts, not where it ends. The gap between an RTO sign-off and site conditions belongs to the business that puts the worker on the task, not to the worker holding the folder.
- When did someone last watch this person do this task, here, with this equipment?
- What would we accept as evidence of skill that a ticket cannot give us?
- Who owns the gap between a qualification and our site conditions, and how do we close it?
- Australian Skills Quality Authority (2025) Practice guide: Assessment. Melbourne: ASQA. Available at: www.asqa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-08/practice-guide-assessment.pdf
- Training Accreditation Council Western Australia (n.d.) Fact sheet: Assessment and assessment judgement. Perth: Government of Western Australia. Available at: www.wa.gov.au/government/publications/fact-sheet-assessment-and-assessment-judgement
Fit on Paper
Fourth night of twelves. The fitness-for-work card is signed. The risk has not moved.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Twelve-hour shifts are not an accident. Two crews instead of three means fewer beds, fewer flights and fewer handovers, and plenty of workers want the swing. That is a legitimate trade-off. It is also a risk decision.
Incident risk climbs through a shift. Pooled data puts risk in the twelfth hour at more than double the average for the first eight, and the fourth consecutive night at about a third higher than the first.
The self-declaration card asks the most tired person on site to judge their own fatigue. Sleep research shows tired people are poor judges of how impaired they are. The card moves the decision onto the worker. The law does not. The duty to manage fatigue stays with the business that sets the roster.
- Which tasks are scheduled into hours ten to twelve of night four, and should they be?
- What evidence did we use to set this roster, and when was it last reviewed?
- If someone declares themselves unfit, what happens next? Is it safe for them to say so?
- Folkard, S. and Tucker, P. (2003) ‘Shift work, safety and productivity’, Occupational Medicine, 53(2), pp. 95–101. Available at: pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12637593/
- Van Dongen, H.P.A., Maislin, G., Mullington, J.M. and Dinges, D.F. (2003) ‘The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: dose-response effects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation’, Sleep, 26(2), pp. 117–126.
- Safe Work Australia (2013) Guide for managing the risk of fatigue at work. Canberra: Safe Work Australia.
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), ss 14, 19 and 28.
Zero on Paper
Zero injuries on the board. A bloke with a sore back on light duties.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Zero targets sound like care. Tie bonuses to injury numbers and the cheapest way to hit zero is to stop counting. Injuries get reclassified, moved to light duties, or never reported.
In 2005, BP’s Texas City refinery had personal injury rates it was proud of. Fifteen people died in one explosion. The independent review panel found that relying on injury rates had given BP a false sense of confidence about process safety.
One UK construction study found zero programmes did not reduce serious accidents and, if anything, were associated with a slight increase. It is one study, and it should be read as one. The point stands either way: a clean scoreboard measures reporting. It does not measure risk.
- What would happen to our injury numbers if reporting got easier tomorrow?
- Which of our measures tell us about serious and fatal risk, not just minor injury?
- Who in this business is paid, promoted or praised for a low number?
- Baker, J.A. et al. (2007) The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Texas City, TX: BP.
- U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2007) Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005 (Report No. 2005-04-I-TX). Washington, DC: CSB. Available at: www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/CSB_BPTC_Investigation_Digest_v3_(004).pdf
- Sherratt, F. and Dainty, A. (2017) ‘UK construction safety: a zero paradox?’, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, 15(2). Available at: repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/UK_construction_safety_a_zero_paradox_/9446696
Clean on Paper
A clean drug test at the gate. Awake since yesterday.
Captioned. Under one minute.
A drug test finds use. It does not find impairment. Urine testing can flag cannabis days after the last use, and in heavier users for a week or more, long after any effect has worn off. The Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission has accepted that there is currently no direct scientific test for impairment from cannabis.
Meanwhile, being awake for 17 to 19 hours can impair performance to a level equivalent to, or worse than, a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05. That worker passes every test at the gate.
This is not an argument against testing. It is an argument against treating a test result as a fitness-for-work decision. A test tells you what is in the body. It does not tell you whether someone is fit for the task in front of them.
- What does our fitness-for-work process catch that a drug test never will?
- How would a supervisor here spot fatigue, and what are they allowed to do about it?
- Are our testing results being used to manage risk, or to manage people?
- Goodwin, R.S. et al. (2008) ‘Urinary elimination of 11-nor-9-carboxy-Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol in cannabis users during continuously monitored abstinence’, Journal of Analytical Toxicology, 32(8), pp. 562–569. Available at: academic.oup.com/jat/article/32/8/562/829835
- Sharp v BCS Infrastructure Support Pty Limited [2015] FWCFB 1033. Available at: www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2015fwcfb1033.htm
- Williamson, A.M. and Feyer, A.M. (2000) ‘Moderate sleep deprivation produces impairments in cognitive and motor performance equivalent to legally prescribed levels of alcohol intoxication’, Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 57(10), pp. 649–655. Available at: pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1739867/
- Dawson, D. and Reid, K. (1997) ‘Fatigue, alcohol and performance impairment’, Nature, 388, p. 235.
Safe on Paper
Forty pages of method statement. Nobody can say what the control is.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Researchers call it safety clutter: safety work that piles up in the name of safety but does not contribute to operational safety. On site, people describe it more bluntly, as paperwork for the sake of having paperwork.
Too often a document is written as a shield for when things go wrong, so it tries to cover everything. As one consultant put it, by trying to cover everything, we cover nothing.
Safe work method statements are a legal requirement for high risk construction work in WA, and they should be. The problem is not the requirement. It is the forty-page version nobody reads. A method statement should tell the crew how this job gets done safely. If the crew cannot use it, it is not a control.
- Pick one SWMS on site. Can the crew doing the job name its three critical controls without looking?
- Which sections exist to protect the business rather than the worker?
- What could we remove from our paperwork tomorrow without making anyone less safe?
- Rae, A., Provan, D., Weber, D. and Dekker, S. (2018) ‘Safety clutter: the accumulation and persistence of “safety” work that does not contribute to operational safety’, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, 16(2), pp. 194–211. Available at: doi.org/10.1080/14773996.2018.1491147
- Lim, H.W., Lingard, H., Zhang, R. and Pirzadeh, P. (2025) Decluttering safety: a multistakeholder approach to enhancing safety management in construction. Position paper. Melbourne: RMIT University. Available at: www.rmit.edu.au/assets/au/en/about/schools-colleges/property-construction/shine/shine-safety-clutter-position-paper-final.pdf
- Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA), r 299.
Supported on Paper
The wellbeing poster is up. The roster has not changed.
Captioned. Under one minute.
An employee assistance program is a good thing to have. It gives people somewhere to turn when work has already hurt them. That makes it support after the harm. It is not a control.
Since 24 December 2022, WA law has required businesses to eliminate psychosocial risks or, where that is not reasonably practicable, minimise them so far as is reasonably practicable. That means the work itself: workload, rosters, role clarity, and how people are treated.
The evidence on individual programs is sobering. A 2024 Oxford study of 46,336 UK workers found that people who took part in individual wellbeing initiatives, such as mindfulness, stress management and wellbeing apps, were no better off than those who did not. A counsellor can help someone cope with the job. Only the business can change it.
- What are the three biggest sources of strain in this team’s work, and which of them has a control that changes the work?
- When did we last change a roster, a workload or a reporting line because of psychosocial risk?
- If our EAP usage went up, would we treat it as a success or as a warning sign?
- Fleming, W.J. (2024) ‘Employee well-being outcomes from individual-level mental health interventions: cross-sectional evidence from the United Kingdom’, Industrial Relations Journal. Available at: doi.org/10.1111/irj.12418
- Commission for Occupational Safety and Health (2022) Code of practice: Psychosocial hazards in the workplace. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/publications/code-practice-psychosocial-hazards-workplace
- Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA), psychosocial risk provisions, in force 24 December 2022.
Closed on Paper
Every action is ticked. The guard is still leaning against the wall.
Captioned. Under one minute.
A corrective action register measures whether someone marked a task complete. It says nothing about whether the hazard changed. When closure rates become the KPI, the easiest actions win: retrain, remind, re-issue the procedure.
The WHS regulations set a hierarchy of control measures. Elimination comes first, then substitution, isolation and engineering controls. Administrative controls and PPE sit at the bottom and are meant to deal with what is left. The same regulations require control measures to be maintained and reviewed, which means someone has to go back and check they still work.
Lundberg, Rollenhagen and Hollnagel found that what investigators recommend is shaped by what is easy to fix, not only by what caused the event. An action that closes in a week is attractive. An action that changes the job is slower, costs money and needs someone with authority. That is exactly why verification matters.
- Pick the last five closed actions on our register. How many changed the work, and how many changed a document or a person?
- Who checks that a closed action actually worked, and when?
- What would happen to our closure rate if we only counted actions verified in the field?
- Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C. and Hollnagel, E. (2010) ‘What you find is not always what you fix: how other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions’, Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(6), pp. 2132–2139. Available at: commons.wmu.se/lib_articles/121
- Safe Work Australia (2024) Model Work Health and Safety Regulations, regs 36–38 (hierarchy of control measures, maintenance and review). Mirrored in the Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA). Available at: www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-07/model-whs-regulations-1_july_2024.pdf
Consulted on Paper
Everyone signed the sheet. Nobody changed the decision.
Captioned. Under one minute.
A sign-on sheet proves attendance. Consultation under WHS law is a different thing with four parts: share the information, give workers a reasonable opportunity to express their views and raise issues, take those views into account, and tell them the outcome in a timely way.
If the decision was made before the meeting, the meeting was a briefing. Briefings have their place, but they do not meet the duty, and they waste the most useful knowledge in the business. The people doing the work know where the procedure does not fit, which tool is missing, and which shortcut has quietly become normal.
The test is simple. Can anyone point to something that changed because workers spoke up? If not, the signatures are recording a ritual, not a conversation.
- Think of the last change we consulted on. What did workers say, and what did we change because of it?
- At what point in a decision do workers usually hear about it: before options are set, or after?
- How do we tell people what we decided and why, especially when we did not take their suggestion?
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), ss 47–49 (duty to consult workers; nature of consultation; when consultation is required).
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) Consultation and worker representation. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/consultation-and-worker-representation
- NT WorkSafe (n.d.) Work health and safety consultation duties (bulletin). Darwin: NT WorkSafe. Available at: worksafe.nt.gov.au/forms-and-resources/bulletins/work-health-and-safety-consultation-duties
Investigated on Paper
Root cause: failed to follow procedure. Corrective action: retrain the worker. Case closed.
Captioned. Under one minute.
“Failed to follow procedure” describes what happened. It does not explain it. A useful investigation starts there and asks why: why the procedure did not fit the job, why the shortcut had become normal, what the person was trying to achieve and what pressures they were under.
Sidney Dekker has argued for years that human error is a symptom of trouble deeper in the system, not its cause. Stop at the person and the conditions that shaped their decision stay exactly where they were, ready for the next person.
Retraining one worker does not change the roster, the tools, the layout or the production pressure. Methods such as ICAM and 5 Whys exist to push past the person. But what you look for is what you find: a method that only asks who will only ever find a who. If the only fix an investigation produces is a person, the system has not been investigated.
- In our last three investigations, how many listed a person as the root cause?
- If someone took the shortcut, how many others take it every day without incident?
- What would change in our investigations if “failed to follow procedure” was not allowed as a final finding?
- Dekker, S. (2014) The Field Guide to Understanding ‘Human Error’. 3rd edn. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C. and Hollnagel, E. (2009) ‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find: the consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals’, Safety Science, 47(10), pp. 1297–1311. Available at: commons.wmu.se/lib_articles/122
Permitted on Paper
The permit is signed. Nobody tried the isolation.
Captioned. Under one minute.
A permit to work is a communication tool. It tells people what work is happening, what has been isolated and who is responsible. It does not make anything safe. The isolation does that, and an isolation is only proven when someone tests it: lock it, tag it, try it.
Piper Alpha is the case every permit system is built on. On 6 July 1988 a pressure safety valve had been removed from a condensate pump for maintenance. The permit for that work sat in a different office and was not reviewed at shift handover. When the other pump tripped that night, the crew tried to bring the one with the missing valve back on line. Condensate most likely leaked from the loosely fitted blank flange and ignited. 167 people died.
The inquiry asked whether the permit procedure was adequate, whether it was followed, whether people were trained in it and whether it was monitored. The answer to all four was no. The paperwork existed. It never reached the people making the decision. That is the test for any permit system: does it change what happens at the valve?
- When did someone last check a live permit against the actual isolation points in the field?
- What happens to open permits at shift change here, and who reviews them?
- Who decides an isolation is proven, and how do they prove it?
- Cullen, The Hon. Lord (1990) The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. London: HMSO.
- Macleod, F. and Richardson, S. (2018) ‘Piper Alpha: the disaster in detail’, The Chemical Engineer, 6 July. Available at: www.thechemicalengineer.com/features/piper-alpha-the-disaster-in-detail/
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) Managing risks of plant in the workplace: Code of practice. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: worksafe.wa.gov.au/publications/managing-risks-plant-workplace-code-practice
Audited on Paper
The audit passed. Nobody watched the work.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Most safety audits test whether the system exists: is there a procedure, a register, a training record, a signature. That has value. But it describes work as imagined, the version written down by people who are not doing it.
Erik Hollnagel distinguishes work as imagined from work as done. Work as done is shaped by real conditions: missing parts, short crews, time pressure and workarounds nobody wrote down. The gap between the two is where the surprises come from, and a desk audit cannot see it.
The sociologist Michael Power called audits rituals of verification. When an organisation is checked on its paperwork, the paperwork improves. That is not the same as the work improving. An audit worth having goes into the field, watches the task and asks the people doing it what gets in the way.
- In our last audit, how many findings came from watching work rather than reading documents?
- Where do we already know the procedure and the job have drifted apart, and why has nothing changed?
- Would our auditors be welcome on night shift, and would the crew tell them the truth?
- Hollnagel, E. (2014) Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Diligent on Paper
The board dashboard is green. No director has been to site in years.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Officers, the people who make or significantly influence decisions about the business, carry a personal duty to exercise due diligence. Under the WHS Act that means keeping up to date on WHS, understanding the operations and their hazards, making sure appropriate resources and processes are in place and used, receiving and responding to information about incidents and risks, and verifying all of it.
Verification is the part most often skipped. A board pack summarises what someone chose to measure, usually lagging injury numbers. It rarely shows the condition of a critical control on a remote site. An officer who relies only on the report has handed their judgement to its author.
In WA the stakes are personal. Officers can face industrial manslaughter charges, with a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment for the crime offence. Due diligence is not a report you receive. It is a set of questions you go and ask, in person, where the work happens.
- When did each of our officers last see the work, and what did they ask while they were there?
- Which of our critical risks would never show up on the board dashboard?
- How do our officers verify that the resources approved for safety were actually used?
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), s 27 (duty of officers) and the industrial manslaughter offences.
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) Officer responsibilities. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: worksafe.wa.gov.au/officer-responsibilities
- Allens (2020) ‘WA WHS Act to introduce industrial manslaughter laws’, Allens Insights, November. Available at: www.allens.com.au/insights-news/insights/2020/11/wa-whs-act-to-introduce-industrial-manslaughter-laws/
Practicable on Paper
The risk assessment says the guard was not reasonably practicable. The guard cost four thousand dollars.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Reasonably practicable is the standard most WHS duties are measured against. Section 18 of the WHS Act sets out what has to be weighed: how likely the hazard or risk is, how bad the harm could be, what the duty holder knows or ought to know about it, and what ways exist to eliminate or minimise it, and how available and suitable they are.
Cost comes last. It is considered only after the risk and the available controls are understood, and it rules a control out only when the cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk. That is a high bar, and it favours safety. A control that is merely expensive, inconvenient or unbudgeted is still reasonably practicable.
The phrase gets misused as a sign-off: write “not reasonably practicable” in the box and the decision looks made. A court will ask what the risk was, what was known, what was available, and what it would have cost. The answer has to be in the record, not in the conclusion.
- Where in our risk assessments do we write “not reasonably practicable”, and what reasoning sits behind each one?
- When cost ruled out a control, did anyone compare that cost against the severity of the harm?
- Would our reasoning on our worst risk hold up if a court read it next to the cost of the control we rejected?
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), s 18 (meaning of reasonably practicable).
- Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (2021) How to determine what is reasonably practicable to meet a health and safety duty. Perth: Government of Western Australia. Available at: www.wa.gov.au/government/publications/how-determine-what-reasonably-practicable-meet-health-and-safety-duty
- Safe Work Australia (2013) How to determine what is reasonably practicable to meet a health and safety duty. Canberra: Safe Work Australia. Available at: www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/resources-and-publications/guidance-materials/how-determine-what-reasonably-practicable-meet-health-and-safety-duty
Critical on Paper
Forty critical controls in the register. Nobody has checked one this month.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Critical control management starts with the events that kill people: a vehicle collision, a fall from height, an uncontrolled release of energy. For each one it identifies the few controls that matter most, the ones whose absence or failure would significantly increase the risk regardless of the other controls in place.
Naming them is the easy part. Each critical control needs a performance standard that says what working looks like, an owner, and a verification routine that checks it in the field, not on a spreadsheet. ICMM’s guidance is clear that verification is what turns a list into a management system.
Controls decay. Interlocks get bridged, berms erode, exclusion zones creep. A register that is never tested reports the design, not the condition. The question for any critical control is not whether it is listed. It is when someone last looked at it working, and what they found.
- For each of our critical controls, who owns it, and when was it last verified in the field?
- What does our performance standard say a working control looks like, in terms a supervisor could check?
- When verification finds a critical control has failed, what happens to the work in the next hour?
- International Council on Mining and Metals (2015) Health and safety critical control management: good practice guide. London: ICMM. Available at: www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/health-and-safety/2015/guidance_ccm-good-practice.pdf
- International Council on Mining and Metals (2015) Critical control management: implementation guide. London: ICMM. Available at: www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/health-and-safety/2015/guidance_ccm-implementation.pdf
- Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA), r 37 (maintenance of control measures) and r 38 (review of control measures).
Supervised on Paper
The supervisor signed off the job at six this morning. From the office in town.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Section 19(3)(f) of the WHS Act requires a business to provide the information, training, instruction or supervision necessary to protect workers from risks. Supervision is a control in its own right, and like any control it has to be adequate for the risk it is meant to manage.
Adequate supervision has three parts. Competence: the supervisor understands the work and its hazards. Presence: they can see the work often enough to notice when it drifts. Authority: they can change or stop the job without asking permission. Remove any one of the three and the role exists only on the organisation chart.
Supervision is often the first thing stretched when crews are cut or sites spread out. Span of control rarely appears in a risk assessment, yet it decides how much of the work anyone actually sees. New, young and transferred workers need more supervision, and they usually get the least.
- How many people and work fronts does each of our supervisors cover, and who decided that number was adequate?
- How often does each supervisor actually see the work, and what do they look for when they do?
- Do our supervisors have the authority to stop a job, and when did one last use it?
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), s 19(3)(f) (information, training, instruction or supervision).
- Department of Local Government, Industry Regulation and Safety (n.d.) Statutory supervisors in WA mining: frequently asked questions. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/system/files/documents/2025-12/BR_MSP-Stat-Supervisor-FAQ_0.pdf
- Work Health and Safety (Mines) Regulations 2022 (WA), Schedule 26 (statutory positions).
Represented on Paper
The site has an elected health and safety representative. She has been waiting nine months for her training.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Health and safety representatives are elected by workers to represent them on WHS matters. The WHS Act gives them real functions and powers, and puts obligations on the business to support them: consult with them, give them access to information, allow them time with pay to do the role, and provide reasonable facilities.
Training is where support most often stalls. An HSR who asks is entitled to attend approved initial training, chosen in consultation with the business, with fees and reasonable costs paid and on their usual pay. The Act says it must happen as soon as practicable within three months of the request.
Training is also what unlocks the HSR’s strongest powers: issuing a provisional improvement notice and directing that unsafe work stop. An untrained HSR cannot use either. A business that delays training has not just broken a rule. It has kept its own early warning system switched off.
- When did each of our HSRs request training, and when did they attend?
- How much paid time do our HSRs actually get for the role, and who decides?
- When did an HSR last raise an issue with us, and what changed because of it?
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), ss 68 (powers and functions of HSRs), 70 (general obligations of PCBU), 72 (training), 85 (direction to cease unsafe work) and 90 (provisional improvement notices).
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) Training for health and safety representatives. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/training-health-and-safety-representatives
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) PCBU obligations to HSRs. HSR Matters. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: hsrmatters.safetyline.wa.gov.au/?p=3187
Inspected on Paper
The inspector is coming Thursday. The yard has never looked better.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Many workplaces treat a regulator’s visit as an exam: clean the yard, file the paperwork, park the broken plant out of sight. It is understandable. It is also a waste. A site staged for one day tells the inspector nothing about the other days, and tells the business nothing it can use.
WHS inspectors have broad powers to enter, examine, ask for documents and interview people, and they can issue notices. They also give advice. An inspector who sees the real site, with its workarounds and worn equipment, can point to problems the business has stopped noticing. That is free expertise.
Hiding hazards has a cost beyond the visit. It is an offence to hinder or obstruct an inspector. More importantly, the hazards are still there on Friday, and so are the workers. The goal is a site that would not need tidying for an inspector, because it is the site people already work in.
- What would we clean up or move before an inspector’s visit, and why is it like that the rest of the time?
- When an inspector last visited, did we treat their findings as advice or as a threat to manage?
- Would our workers say the site on inspection day looks like the site they work in?
- Work Health and Safety Act 2020 (WA), Part 9 (securing compliance: inspectors and their powers) and s 188 (offence to hinder or obstruct inspector).
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) When an inspector calls. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/when-inspector-calls
- WorkSafe WA (n.d.) Role of WorkSafe inspectors and dangerous goods safety officers. Perth: WorkSafe WA. Available at: www.worksafe.wa.gov.au/worksafe-inspectors-and-dangerous-goods-safety-officers
Assessed on Paper
Twelve signatures on the risk assessment. The job changed after lunch.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Job hazard analyses and safe work method statements exist to make people think about a task before they start it: the steps, the hazards, the controls. For high risk construction work, a SWMS is a legal requirement, and the work has to be done in line with it.
Over time the document becomes the point. Templates get copied from the last job, signatures get collected at the ute before anyone reads the page, and the form describes work that is no longer happening. Research on SWMS in Australian construction has found a persistent gap between the work as written and the work as done.
The law expects the SWMS to keep up with the work. It has to be reviewed when the work changes, and if the work is not being done in line with it, the work has to stop until it is. The test is not how many people signed. It is whether the crew could explain the hazards and controls of the job they are doing right now.
- How many of our SWMS were copied from a previous job, and what changed between the two?
- When the work changes partway through a shift, what actually happens to the SWMS?
- Could a crew member explain the top three hazards on today’s job without looking at the form?
- Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA), rr 299–303 (safe work method statements for high risk construction work).
- Borys, D. (2012) ‘The role of safe work method statements in the Australian construction industry’, Safety Science, 50(2), pp. 210–220. Available at: doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2011.08.010
- Safe Work Australia (n.d.) Safe work method statement for high risk construction work: information sheet. Canberra: Safe Work Australia. Available at: www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/doc/safe-work-method-statement-high-risk-construction-work-information-sheet
Changed on Paper
The change request was approved in a day. Nobody looked at what the change did to the risk.
Captioned. Under one minute.
Workplaces change constantly: new plant, new chemicals, a different contractor, a smaller crew, a temporary fix that becomes permanent. Each change can bring hazards the existing controls were never designed for. Management of change is the process that asks what the change does to the risk before it goes ahead.
At Flixborough in 1974, a cracked reactor was removed and a temporary bypass pipe was fabricated in about 30 hours to keep the plant running. It was not designed by a qualified mechanical engineer, and the site had no management of change procedure in use. Two months later the bypass failed. The vapour cloud explosion killed 28 people.
The WHS Regulations require control measures to be reviewed before a change at the workplace that is likely to give rise to a new or different risk. Many businesses have a change form. Fewer have a change process that brings in the right expertise, updates the risk assessment, retrains people and checks the controls once the change is in.
- Which of our recent changes went through a form but not a risk review?
- Who in our business has the authority to say a change needs specialist input before it proceeds?
- Which temporary fixes on our site have quietly become permanent?
- Department of Employment (1975) The Flixborough disaster: report of the Court of Inquiry. London: HMSO.
- Turney, R. (2024) ‘Flixborough 50 years on: lessons for managers and engineers today’, The Chemical Engineer, 30 May. Available at: www.thechemicalengineer.com/features/flixborough-50-years-on-lessons-for-managers-and-engineers-today/
- Work Health and Safety (General) Regulations 2022 (WA), r 38 (review of control measures).
Using these at work
Play one at the start of a toolbox talk, pre-start or leadership meeting, then work through the three questions. Share the page link rather than downloading the files, so the sources travel with the film.
These films were made with AI animation and AI voice tools, scripted and fact-checked by Tom Bourne. Pig and Wolf are fictional, as are the organisations shown. Music licensed from Adobe Stock and Audiio. This is general information, not legal advice for your workplace.
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